About: Advantage (cryptography)

Facets (new session)
Description
Metadata
Settings
- Rule:
- Inverse Functional Properties:
- "Same As":

About: Advantage (cryptography) Goto Sponge NotDistinct Permalink

An Entity of Type : dbo:Software, within Data Space : dbpedia.demo.openlinksw.com associated with source document(s)
QRcode icon

http://dbpedia.demo.openlinksw.com/describe/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fdbpedia.org%2Fresource%2FAdvantage_%28cryptography%29&invfp=IFP_OFF&sas=SAME_AS_OFF

In cryptography, an adversary's advantage is a measure of how successfully it can attack a cryptographic algorithm, by distinguishing it from an idealized version of that type of algorithm. Note that in this context, the "adversary" is itself an algorithm and not a person. A cryptographic algorithm is considered secure if no adversary has a non-negligible advantage, subject to specified bounds on the adversary's computational resources (see concrete security). "Negligible" usually means "within O(2−p)" where p is a security parameter associated with the algorithm. For example, p might be the number of bits in a block cipher's key.

Attributes	Values
rdf:type	software
rdfs:label	Advantage (cryptography) (en) Avantage (cryptologie) (fr)
rdfs:comment	In cryptography, an adversary's advantage is a measure of how successfully it can attack a cryptographic algorithm, by distinguishing it from an idealized version of that type of algorithm. Note that in this context, the "adversary" is itself an algorithm and not a person. A cryptographic algorithm is considered secure if no adversary has a non-negligible advantage, subject to specified bounds on the adversary's computational resources (see concrete security). "Negligible" usually means "within O(2−p)" where p is a security parameter associated with the algorithm. For example, p might be the number of bits in a block cipher's key. (en) En cryptologie, la notion d'avantage mesure la capacité d'un adversaire a distinguer entre un objet cryptographique réel et un modèle idéalisé (ou plus généralement, entre deux situations). Essentiellement, l'avantage mesure à quel point l'adversaire fait « mieux que le hasard » dans cet exercice. La notion a été introduite en 1982 par les cryptologues Shafi Goldwasser et Silvio Micali pour définir formellement la sécurité sémantique du chiffrement à clé publique. (fr)
dcterms:subject	Theory of cryptography
Wikipage page ID	4636092 (xsd:integer)
Wikipage revision ID	1074492267 (xsd:integer)
Link from a Wikipage to another Wikipage	Algorithm Permutation Security parameter Concrete security Cryptography Oracle machine Mihir Bellare Brute force attack Chosen-ciphertext attack Chosen-plaintext attack Stirling's approximation Computational complexity theory Key (cryptography) Person Data Encryption Standard Adversary (cryptography) Theory of cryptography Big O notation Block cipher dbr:PR-CPA_advantage Phillip Rogaway Brute-force search Platonic ideal Factorial Random oracle Pseudorandom-function advantage Key-recovery advantage
Link from a Wikipage to an external page	http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~oded/foc-book.html https://web.archive.org/web/20071011235219/http:/www-cse.ucsd.edu/~mihir/cse207/classnotes.html
sameAs	Advantage (cryptography) Advantage (cryptography) Advantage (cryptography) Advantage (cryptography)
dbp:wikiPageUsesTemplate	dbt:Nofootnotes dbt:Page_numbers_needed
has abstract	In cryptography, an adversary's advantage is a measure of how successfully it can attack a cryptographic algorithm, by distinguishing it from an idealized version of that type of algorithm. Note that in this context, the "adversary" is itself an algorithm and not a person. A cryptographic algorithm is considered secure if no adversary has a non-negligible advantage, subject to specified bounds on the adversary's computational resources (see concrete security). "Negligible" usually means "within O(2−p)" where p is a security parameter associated with the algorithm. For example, p might be the number of bits in a block cipher's key. (en) En cryptologie, la notion d'avantage mesure la capacité d'un adversaire a distinguer entre un objet cryptographique réel et un modèle idéalisé (ou plus généralement, entre deux situations). Essentiellement, l'avantage mesure à quel point l'adversaire fait « mieux que le hasard » dans cet exercice. La notion a été introduite en 1982 par les cryptologues Shafi Goldwasser et Silvio Micali pour définir formellement la sécurité sémantique du chiffrement à clé publique. L'avantage dépend du jeu de sécurité considéré, des pouvoirs de l'adversaire (généralement formalisés au moyen d'oracles), de la classe d'adversaires étudiée et éventuellement d'autres paramètres. En règle générale, on cherche à prouver que l'avantage est une fonction négligeable du paramètre de sécurité, ce qui garantit que l'objet cryptographique réel et son modèle idéalisé ne peuvent pas être distingués par un attaquant. Plusieurs techniques classiques permettent d'obtenir une borne sur l'avantage dans un jeu donné, comme les arguments hybrides ou les coefficients H. (fr)
gold:hypernym	Measure
prov:wasDerivedFrom	wikipedia-en:Advantage_(cryptography)?oldid=1074492267&ns=0
page length (characters) of wiki page	5702 (xsd:nonNegativeInteger)
foaf:isPrimaryTopicOf	wikipedia-en:Advantage_(cryptography)
is Link from a Wikipage to another Wikipage of	Index of cryptography articles Pseudorandom function family Dual EC DRBG Hard-core predicate Pseudorandom number generator Advantage Pseudorandom generator theorem Ciphertext indistinguishability Pseudorandom permutation
is Wikipage disambiguates of	Advantage
is foaf:primaryTopic of	wikipedia-en:Advantage_(cryptography)

Faceted Search & Find service v1.17_git139 as of Feb 29 2024

Alternative Linked Data Documents: ODE Content Formats:

RDF

ODATA

Microdata

About

OpenLink Virtuoso version 08.03.3330 as of Mar 19 2024, on Linux (x86_64-generic-linux-glibc212), Single-Server Edition (378 GB total memory, 53 GB memory in use)
Data on this page belongs to its respective rights holders.
Virtuoso Faceted Browser Copyright © 2009-2024 OpenLink Software