Secure two-party computation (2PC) a.k.a. Secure function evaluation is sub-problem of secure multi-party computation (MPC) that has received special attention by researchers because of its close relation to many cryptographic tasks. The goal of 2PC is to create a generic protocol that allows two parties to jointly compute an arbitrary function on their inputs without sharing the value of their inputs with the opposing party. One of the most well known examples of 2PC is Yao's Millionaires' problem, in which two parties, Alice and Bob, are millionaires who wish to determine who is wealthier without revealing their wealth. Formally, Alice has wealth , Bob has wealth , and they wish to compute without revealing the values or .
| Attributes | Values |
|---|
| rdf:type
| |
| rdfs:label
| - Computación segura bipartita (es)
- Secure two-party computation (en)
|
| rdfs:comment
| - La Computación Segura Bipartita o 2PC (siglas del inglés Secure Two-Party Computation) es un subconjunto de la Computación segura multipartita, cuyo objetivo es crear protocolos que permitan a dos partes computar de manera conjunta una función arbitraria de sus entradas sin compartir entre ellas el valor de sus entradas. Es frecuente que la computación segura bipartita involucre funciones criptográficas dando lugar a protocolos criptográficos bipartitos (es)
- Secure two-party computation (2PC) a.k.a. Secure function evaluation is sub-problem of secure multi-party computation (MPC) that has received special attention by researchers because of its close relation to many cryptographic tasks. The goal of 2PC is to create a generic protocol that allows two parties to jointly compute an arbitrary function on their inputs without sharing the value of their inputs with the opposing party. One of the most well known examples of 2PC is Yao's Millionaires' problem, in which two parties, Alice and Bob, are millionaires who wish to determine who is wealthier without revealing their wealth. Formally, Alice has wealth , Bob has wealth , and they wish to compute without revealing the values or . (en)
|
| dcterms:subject
| |
| Wikipage page ID
| |
| Wikipage revision ID
| |
| Link from a Wikipage to another Wikipage
| |
| sameAs
| |
| dbp:wikiPageUsesTemplate
| |
| has abstract
| - La Computación Segura Bipartita o 2PC (siglas del inglés Secure Two-Party Computation) es un subconjunto de la Computación segura multipartita, cuyo objetivo es crear protocolos que permitan a dos partes computar de manera conjunta una función arbitraria de sus entradas sin compartir entre ellas el valor de sus entradas. Es frecuente que la computación segura bipartita involucre funciones criptográficas dando lugar a protocolos criptográficos bipartitos Uno de los ejemplos mejor conocidos de 2PC es el Problema de los Millonarios, en el cual dos partes, A y B, son millonarios que quieren determinar quien es el más rico sin revelar el patrimonio de cada uno. Formalmente A tiene una riqueza de , B tiene una riqueza de , y se quiere determinar si es verdad que sin revelar los valores de o . Un problema de contexto similar (aunque su propuesta es un poco más acotada que la de Yao) fue planteado por Manuel Blum, donde se desea lanzar una moneda a través de un teléfono. (es)
- Secure two-party computation (2PC) a.k.a. Secure function evaluation is sub-problem of secure multi-party computation (MPC) that has received special attention by researchers because of its close relation to many cryptographic tasks. The goal of 2PC is to create a generic protocol that allows two parties to jointly compute an arbitrary function on their inputs without sharing the value of their inputs with the opposing party. One of the most well known examples of 2PC is Yao's Millionaires' problem, in which two parties, Alice and Bob, are millionaires who wish to determine who is wealthier without revealing their wealth. Formally, Alice has wealth , Bob has wealth , and they wish to compute without revealing the values or . Yao's garbled circuit protocol for two-party computation only provided security against passive adversaries. One of the first general solutions for achieving security against active adversary was introduced by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson by applying Zero-Knowledge Proof to enforce semi-honest behavior. This approach was known to be impractical for years due to high complexity overheads. However, significant improvements have been made toward applying this method in 2PC and Abascal, Faghihi Sereshgi, Hazay, Yuval Ishai and Venkitasubramaniam gave the first efficient protocol based on this approach. Another type of 2PC protocols that are secure against active adversaries were proposed by Yehuda Lindell and Benny Pinkas, Ishai, Manoj Prabhakaran and Amit Sahai and Jesper Buus Nielsen and Claudio Orlandi. Another solution for this problem, that explicitly works with committed input was proposed by Stanisław Jarecki and Vitaly Shmatikov. (en)
|
| prov:wasDerivedFrom
| |
| page length (characters) of wiki page
| |
| foaf:isPrimaryTopicOf
| |
| is Link from a Wikipage to another Wikipage
of | |
| is Wikipage redirect
of | |
| is foaf:primaryTopic
of | |
![[RDF Data]](/fct/images/sw-rdf-blue.png)
![[cxml]](/fct/images/cxml_doc.png)
![[csv]](/fct/images/csv_doc.png)
![[text]](/fct/images/ntriples_doc.png)
![[turtle]](/fct/images/n3turtle_doc.png)
![[ld+json]](/fct/images/jsonld_doc.png)
![[rdf+json]](/fct/images/json_doc.png)
![[rdf+xml]](/fct/images/xml_doc.png)
![[atom+xml]](/fct/images/atom_doc.png)
![[html]](/fct/images/html_doc.png)