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About: United States v. Sharpe     Goto   Sponge   NotDistinct   Permalink

An Entity of Type : dbo:SupremeCourtOfTheUnitedStatesCase, within Data Space : dbpedia.demo.openlinksw.com associated with source document(s)

Type: ThingcaseLegal Caseunit of workLegal caseSupreme Court of the United States case New Facet based on Instances of this Class

United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985), was an important decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court explained how long police are permitted to stop vehicles as part of an investigatory stop before violating the Fourth Amendment. A seven-member majority of the Court determined the twenty minute stop in this case was legal, so the government won. However, the Court declined to adopt a bright line rule, deciding instead that "common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria." The Court announced that the rule for determining whether a detention is too long will depend on whether the police "diligently pursued" an investigation to quickly confirm or dispel their suspicions. The Court clarified that judges should avoid "unrealistic second-guessing" of