In cryptography, the Davies attack is a dedicated statistical cryptanalysis method for attacking the Data Encryption Standard (DES). The attack was originally created in 1987 by Donald Davies. In 1994, Eli Biham and Alex Biryukov made significant improvements to the technique. It is a known-plaintext attack based on the non-uniform distribution of the outputs of pairs of adjacent S-boxes. It works by collecting many known plaintext/ciphertext pairs and calculating the empirical distribution of certain characteristics. Bits of the key can be deduced given sufficiently many known plaintexts, leaving the remaining bits to be found through brute force. There are tradeoffs between the number of required plaintexts, the number of key bits found, and the probability of success; the attack can fin
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| - Davies attack (en)
- Attacco di Davies (it)
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| - In cryptography, the Davies attack is a dedicated statistical cryptanalysis method for attacking the Data Encryption Standard (DES). The attack was originally created in 1987 by Donald Davies. In 1994, Eli Biham and Alex Biryukov made significant improvements to the technique. It is a known-plaintext attack based on the non-uniform distribution of the outputs of pairs of adjacent S-boxes. It works by collecting many known plaintext/ciphertext pairs and calculating the empirical distribution of certain characteristics. Bits of the key can be deduced given sufficiently many known plaintexts, leaving the remaining bits to be found through brute force. There are tradeoffs between the number of required plaintexts, the number of key bits found, and the probability of success; the attack can fin (en)
- In crittanalisi, l'attacco di Davies è un metodo statistico per attaccare l'algoritmo di cifratura Data Encryption Standard (DES). Originariamente creato da nel 1987 e migliorato significativamente nel 1994 da Eli Biham e , questo metodo è un attacco di tipo known-plaintext che sfrutta la distribuzione non uniforme dell'output delle coppie di S-box adiacenti. C'è un bilanciamento tra il numero di testi in chiaro richiesti, il numero di bit della chiave trovati e la probabilità di successo: l'attacco può trovare 24 bit della chiave con 252 testi in chiaro conosciuti e con il 53% di successo. (it)
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| - In cryptography, the Davies attack is a dedicated statistical cryptanalysis method for attacking the Data Encryption Standard (DES). The attack was originally created in 1987 by Donald Davies. In 1994, Eli Biham and Alex Biryukov made significant improvements to the technique. It is a known-plaintext attack based on the non-uniform distribution of the outputs of pairs of adjacent S-boxes. It works by collecting many known plaintext/ciphertext pairs and calculating the empirical distribution of certain characteristics. Bits of the key can be deduced given sufficiently many known plaintexts, leaving the remaining bits to be found through brute force. There are tradeoffs between the number of required plaintexts, the number of key bits found, and the probability of success; the attack can find 24 bits of the key with 252 known plaintexts and 53% success rate. The Davies attack can be adapted to other Feistel ciphers besides DES. In 1998, Pornin developed techniques for analyzing and maximizing a cipher's resistance to this kind of cryptanalysis. (en)
- In crittanalisi, l'attacco di Davies è un metodo statistico per attaccare l'algoritmo di cifratura Data Encryption Standard (DES). Originariamente creato da nel 1987 e migliorato significativamente nel 1994 da Eli Biham e , questo metodo è un attacco di tipo known-plaintext che sfrutta la distribuzione non uniforme dell'output delle coppie di S-box adiacenti. Questa tecnica consiste nel collezionare molte coppie testo-in-chiaro/testo-cifrato e nel calcolare la distribuzione empirica di certe caratteristiche. Alcuni bit della chiave possono essere dedotti da un numero sufficiente delle suddette coppie, lasciando che i restanti bit vengano trovati tramite ricerca esaustiva. C'è un bilanciamento tra il numero di testi in chiaro richiesti, il numero di bit della chiave trovati e la probabilità di successo: l'attacco può trovare 24 bit della chiave con 252 testi in chiaro conosciuti e con il 53% di successo. (it)
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