Prim–Read theory, or Prim–Read defense, was an important development in game theory that led to radical changes in the United States' views on the value of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. The theory assigns a certain cost to deploying defensive missiles and suggests a way to maximize their value in terms of the amount of damage they could reduce. By comparing the cost of various deployments, one can determine the relative amount of money needed to provide a defense against a certain number of ICBMs.
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| - Prim–Read theory, or Prim–Read defense, was an important development in game theory that led to radical changes in the United States' views on the value of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. The theory assigns a certain cost to deploying defensive missiles and suggests a way to maximize their value in terms of the amount of damage they could reduce. By comparing the cost of various deployments, one can determine the relative amount of money needed to provide a defense against a certain number of ICBMs. (en)
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| - Prim–Read theory, or Prim–Read defense, was an important development in game theory that led to radical changes in the United States' views on the value of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. The theory assigns a certain cost to deploying defensive missiles and suggests a way to maximize their value in terms of the amount of damage they could reduce. By comparing the cost of various deployments, one can determine the relative amount of money needed to provide a defense against a certain number of ICBMs. The theory was first introduced in the late 1950s and might have been lost to history had it not been picked up during the debate on the Nike-X ABM. Nike-X called for the deployment of a heavy defensive system around major US cities with the intent of seriously blunting the effect of any Soviet strike. A number of operations researchers, notably US Air Force General Glenn Kent, used Prim–Read to conclusively demonstrate that the cost of reducing damage back to a given level was always more than the cost of causing additional damage by building more ICBMs. The outcome of these studies suggested that any US deployment of an ABM system would result in the USSR building a small number of additional missiles to defeat it. Assuming the Soviets would come to the same conclusion, Robert McNamara became highly critical of any large-scale ABM system, and began efforts that would ultimately lead to the ABM treaty in 1972. The underlying concept became known as the cost-exchange ratio. (en)
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