. . . "In April 1863, the presidents of the southern railroads again convened in Richmond and again addressed Secretary Seddon on the condition of the rails and appealed to Congress for remedial legislation...No record is available which shows that these recommendations were acted upon by the confederate government."@en . . . . . . "2089155"^^ . . . . . "Confederate railroads in the American Civil War"@en . . . . . . . "27.0"^^ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "The American Civil War was the first in which large armies depended heavily on railroads to bring supplies. For the Confederate States Army, the system was fragile and was designed for short hauls of cotton to the nearest river or ocean port. During the war, new parts were hard to obtain, and the system deteriorated from overuse, lack of maintenance, and systematic destruction by Union raiders. The outbreak of war had a depressing effect on the economic fortunes of the Confederate railroad industry. With the cotton crop being hoarded under the \"King Cotton\" theory, railroads lost their main source of income. Many were forced to lay off employees, and in particular, let go skilled technicians and engineers. Due to a general opinion that the war would not last long, initially Confederate rail operators did not seek, nor build, alternative sources of iron for rail construction and repair. Although railroad contracts to port towns had ceased, due to the combined effects of the cotton export policy and the Union naval blockade, lucrative government contracts were doled out to rail operators with lines supplying men and arms to the front line of Tennessee and Virginia. A consortium of rail operators had decided upon a universal rate for government contracts; \"a uniform rate of two cents a mile for men and half the regular local rate for munitions, provisions, and material, and also agreed to accept Confederate bonds at par in payment of government transportation.\" In addition, the Confederacy suffered from two key deficiencies in its rail network. First was the route structure: it was built to serve the coastal shipping industry, and most rail lines connected ports and river terminals to points inland. This lack of inter-railway connections made many railroads useless once the Union blockade was in place. Second was break of gauge; much of the Confederate rail network was in the 5 ft (1,524 mm) broad gauge format, but much of North Carolina and Virginia had 4 ft 8+1\u20442 in (1,435 mm) standard gauge lines. Sometimes, as with Montgomery, Alabama, a city was served by two railroads with different gauge and different depots, meaning that through cargo had to be unloaded from one railroad and moved by animal-powered transportation to the other company's station, where it would be re-loaded. Southern railroads west of the Mississippi were isolated, disconnected, and differed widely in gauge. Several of the Northern railroads, in contrast, were complex networks in themselves, and many cities were served by more than one. The fact that most used the same gauge made transfer even easier."@en . . . . . . . . . . . . . "left"@en . . . . "Premier conflit total de l'\u00E8re moderne, la guerre de S\u00E9cession met en exergue le r\u00F4le d\u00E9terminant que les chemins de fer joueront dans les conflits \u00E0 venir, en particulier dans le domaine de la logistique et du transport de troupes. Mais si le r\u00E9seau particuli\u00E8rement bien d\u00E9velopp\u00E9 du Nord et une gestion rigoureuse et sans compromis de ses moyens ferroviaires eurent un effet d\u00E9terminant sur la victoire de l'Union, les faiblesses du r\u00E9seau conf\u00E9d\u00E9r\u00E9 ante bellum - dues principalement au faible niveau de d\u00E9veloppement industriel des \u00C9tats s\u00E9cessionnistes -, et une gestion anarchique et t\u00E2tonnante, marqu\u00E9e par l'improvisation voire la corruption, de l'arme ferroviaire par les autorit\u00E9s civiles et militaires de la Conf\u00E9d\u00E9ration contribuent pour une bonne part \u00E0 la d\u00E9faite du Sud, m\u00EAme si les de"@fr . "The American Civil War was the first in which large armies depended heavily on railroads to bring supplies. For the Confederate States Army, the system was fragile and was designed for short hauls of cotton to the nearest river or ocean port. During the war, new parts were hard to obtain, and the system deteriorated from overuse, lack of maintenance, and systematic destruction by Union raiders."@en . . . . . . . . . . . "Premier conflit total de l'\u00E8re moderne, la guerre de S\u00E9cession met en exergue le r\u00F4le d\u00E9terminant que les chemins de fer joueront dans les conflits \u00E0 venir, en particulier dans le domaine de la logistique et du transport de troupes. Mais si le r\u00E9seau particuli\u00E8rement bien d\u00E9velopp\u00E9 du Nord et une gestion rigoureuse et sans compromis de ses moyens ferroviaires eurent un effet d\u00E9terminant sur la victoire de l'Union, les faiblesses du r\u00E9seau conf\u00E9d\u00E9r\u00E9 ante bellum - dues principalement au faible niveau de d\u00E9veloppement industriel des \u00C9tats s\u00E9cessionnistes -, et une gestion anarchique et t\u00E2tonnante, marqu\u00E9e par l'improvisation voire la corruption, de l'arme ferroviaire par les autorit\u00E9s civiles et militaires de la Conf\u00E9d\u00E9ration contribuent pour une bonne part \u00E0 la d\u00E9faite du Sud, m\u00EAme si les deux camps comprennent d'embl\u00E9e l'importance de cette nouvelle technique dans la guerre moderne."@fr . . "1080889822"^^ . . . . . . . . . "14953"^^ . . . . . . . . "Chemins de fer conf\u00E9d\u00E9r\u00E9s dans la guerre de S\u00E9cession"@fr . . . .