. . . . . . . "Kartik Paul (CPIML)"@en . . . . . . "100"^^ . . . . . . . . "Bhumi Uchhed Pratirodh Committee"@en . . . . . . . . . "Nandigram Violence refers to the violence in Nandigram, West Bengal, India, in 2007 due to the land acquisition for a project taken up by the CPI(M)-led Government of West Bengal to create a chemical hub, a type of special economic zone (SEZ). The policy led to an emergency in the region, and 14 people died in a police shooting. According to Criminal Investigation Department (CID) reports, the Nandigram violence saw a Maoist insurgency in the area during the protests. However the Home Secretary of West Bengal stated that the presence of Maoists could not be confirmed in Nandigram. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) later exonerated the Buddhadeb Bhattacharya government of responsibility for the shootings. However, Buddhadeb Bhattacharya had said earlier \"They (the opposition) have been paid back in the same coin,\" supporting the violence in Nandigram by his own party workers."@en . . . . . "Marxist-Leninist Groups"@en . . . "Nandigram violence"@en . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "Government of West Bengal led by Left front\n\n\n\nsupported by:\n\n\n\nUnsupport by:"@en . . "Nandigram Violence"@en . . . . . . . . . . . . "30537"^^ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "*Left Front government withdraw the land acquisition.\n*Fall of Left Front government in west bengal."@en . . . . . "Nandigram Violence refers to the violence in Nandigram, West Bengal, India, in 2007 due to the land acquisition for a project taken up by the CPI(M)-led Government of West Bengal to create a chemical hub, a type of special economic zone (SEZ). The policy led to an emergency in the region, and 14 people died in a police shooting."@en . "2007"^^ . . . "10196097"^^ . . . . . . . . . . . . . "In 2007, due to the land acquisition for a project by the WB Government led by the Left Front to create a special economic zone."@en . . . . "1113063477"^^ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "14"^^ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .