. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "The German Radio Intelligence Operation were signals intelligence operations that were undertaken by German Axis forces in Europe during World War II. In keeping with German signals practice since 1942, the term \"communication intelligence\" (German: Nachrichtenaufkl\u00E4rung) had been used when intercept units were assigned to observe both enemy \"radio and wire\" communication. When the observation of only enemy \"radio\" communication was undertaken, the term was \"radio intelligence\" (German: funkaufkl\u00E4rung). The term \"intercept service\" (German: Horchdienst) was also used up until 1942."@en . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "248796"^^ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "The German Radio Intelligence Operation were signals intelligence operations that were undertaken by German Axis forces in Europe during World War II. In keeping with German signals practice since 1942, the term \"communication intelligence\" (German: Nachrichtenaufkl\u00E4rung) had been used when intercept units were assigned to observe both enemy \"radio and wire\" communication. When the observation of only enemy \"radio\" communication was undertaken, the term was \"radio intelligence\" (German: funkaufkl\u00E4rung). The term \"intercept service\" (German: Horchdienst) was also used up until 1942. Towards the end of the war, about 12,000 troopers of the German Army were engaged in German Intercept Station Operations during World War II against increasingly powerful enemies. With the decline of information gained by intelligence through aerial observation, prisoner of war interrogations, and reports from enemy agents, communication intelligence became increasingly important. As a result of communication intelligence, German commanders were better informed about the enemy and his intentions than in any previous war. While this form of electronic warfare was being waged, another aspect also gained steadily in importance, on the high-frequency battlefield of Radar in World War II. Radar used Microwave transmission for the location and recognition of enemy units in the air and on the sea, and each side adopted defensive measures, especially in air and submarine warfare. The third aspect of this electronic warfare, was the radio broadcasters' war, in which propaganda experts endeavored to influence by providing propaganda against the enemy, through foreign language broadcasts over increasingly powerful transmitters. These three aspects of the radio war continued as a \"cold war of the airwaves\", even when the guns were silent."@en . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "54778619"^^ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "1119478887"^^ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "German radio intelligence operations during World War II"@en . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .